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CASE COMMENTS
Such an arbitrary definition of "affecting commerce," however,
would destroy the distinction between interstate commerce and
commerce affecting the internal affairs of a state. "That distinc-
tion between what is national and what is local in the activities of
commerce is vital to the maintenance of our federal system."
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra. Numerous deci-
sions indicate that the courts would not accept the criteria of
volume of sales alone as adequate evidence that a business activity
affected commerce. NLRB v. Fainblatt, supra; NLRB v. Drum-
mond, 21 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1954). The proper criterion for de-
termining jurisdiction is the impact of local action on interstate
commerce which must be determined as a matter of fact on a
case-by-case basis. NLRB v. Benevento, 297 F.2d 873 (1st Cir.
1961).
The decisions in the instant case and in NLRB v. Benevento,
supra, make it clear that the Board must present strong evidence
of the affect of local business activity on interstate commerce to
support a finding of fact that it has jurisdiction over a local busi-
ness, or its rulings will not be enforced by the Federal Courts.
Herbert Stephenson Boreman, Jr.
Labor Law-Mandatory Requirements of Bargaining
Union submitted to employer a contract including a proposal
that the employer execute a performance bond. Employer as-
sented to all terms except the performance bond and an impasse
was reached on this issue. The union struck, and the employer
charged the union with an unfair labor practice in proceedings
before the NLRB. The NLRB found that the union's insistence
upon a performance bond amounted to a refusal to bargain in
good faith, National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (3) (1952), and ordered the union to cease and desist.
Held: enforcement granted. A performance bond is not within the
scope of mandatory bargaining under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act § 8(b) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1952). Refusal
to come to an agreement over a condition which is not within the
scope of mandatory bargaining is a refusal to bargain collectively
in good faith which is an unfair labor practice. Local 164, Brother-
hood of Painters v. NLRB, 293 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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The Wagner Act of 1935 placed requirements on employers to
recognize the certified bargaining agents of the employees, and
to bargain collectively with them about wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment. National Labor Relations
Act §§ 8(a) (5), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), 159(a) (1952).
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 added similar provisions with respect
to unions, and added a provision requiring both the union and
employer to bargain in good faith. National Labor Relations Act
§§ 8(b) (3), 8(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (3), 158(d) (1952).
The principal case and many others have construed the words
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employmene' to
mean that these are subjects of mandatory bargaining. If a subject
is mandatory, then an employer or union must bargain collectively
about that subject or it is an unfair labor practice. Subjects neither
mandatory nor expressly prohibited by the Act are permissive
bargaining subjects. An employer or union may, on request, bar-
gain over these subjects, but it is not an unfair labor practice to
refuse to bargain about permissive subjects. If a subject is man-
datory, it is not unlawful to bargain in good faith to the point of
impasse. However, if a subject is permissive, then it is unlawful
to bargain to the point of impasse over such a subject. NLRB v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Allis-Chalmers Co. V.
NLRB, 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954).
In NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., supra, the Court held that it
was an unfair labor practice for the employer to insist, to the point
of impasse, upon provisions calling for a pre-strike vote by the
employees and a "recognition" clause which excluded a union
certified by the NLRB. The Court defined mandatory bargaining
subjects as "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment," and held it to be an unfair labor practice to insist to
the point of impasse upon subjects not included within that defini-
tion. The clauses in question were lawful and were proper sub-
jects of negotiation, but neither could be insisted upon as a condi-
tion to entering a collective bargaining agreement.
These decisions have the effect of placing the NLRB in the
position of deciding which provisions of a labor contract are
mandatory and which are permissive. One of the primary objec-
tives of the National Labor Relations Act is to create stability in
industrial relationships and to promote industrial peace. Brooks
v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). By eliminating certain subjects
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from those which can lawfully be demanded to the point of im-
passe, the courts are furthering this objective. Such a policy tends
to reduce the number of strikes and also tends to limit labor
disputes to certain basic areas.
The danger of such a policy is that it has the effect of placing
the NLRB at the bargaining table along with representatives of
labor and management. The NLRB is then in a position of having
to take sides with either labor or management when one or the
other insists on a provision which is in the gray area between
mandatory and permissive bargaining. Cox, The Duty to Bargain
in Good Faith, 71 HAIIv. L. REv. 1401 (1955). It is not the pur-
pose of the National Labor Relations Act to determine what mat-
ters are or are not included in the collective bargaining agreement,
but Congress intended that the parties have a wide latitude in
their negotiations within the framework of the Act. NLRB V. In-
surance Agents, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
The National Labor Relations Act was passed so that the em-
ployer and the employees would be put on an equal basis so that
they would be enabled to bargain collectively over matters of
mutual interest. The NLRB was set up to insure that the rights
and protections guaranteed by the Act would be observed by both
sides. The Act was the framework in which labor and manage-
ment could bargain collectively, to determine the best contract
that their respective bargaining positions could attain. When sec-
tion 8(a) of the Wagner Act was being debated in Congress, Sen-
ator Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor, said:
"When the employees have chosen their organization, when
they have selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to
do is escort them to the door of the employer and say, 'Here they
are, the legal representatives of your employees.' What happens
behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not
seek to inquire into it." 79 CONG. REc. 7660 (1935).
As the law now stands, the NLRB is placed in the position of having
to decide whether disputes over clauses in labor contracts are man-
datory bargaining subjects instead of the parties determining what
should be embodied in their own collective agreement.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in the Borg-Warner case,
pointed out that the result of the majority opinion was to leave
certain subjects which may be bargained over, but which may not
1962.
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be insisted upon. As a practical matter such subjects will be
eliminated from labor contracts because neither party can be forced
to accept them. He expressed the view that it was not the intention
of Congress in setting out "wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment' to limit collective bargaining to those
things. Rather, these were merely guides to help the NLRB to deter-
mine when the parties were acting in good faith.
The decision in the principal case is in accord with the current
interpretation given to the National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (3),
29 U.S.C. 158(b) (3) (1952), assuming that the court was correct
in deciding that a performance bond is not within the scope of man-
datory bargaining. However, in following this policy the courts are
consciously or unconsciously allowing the government to enter
substantive labor negotiations, by allowing the NLRB to decide
what are subjects of bargaining in labor agreements.
John Templeton Kay, Jr.
Labor Law-Statute of Limitations Under Taft-Hartley Act § 303
D contended that P's action to recover damages under the
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 303, 61 Stat.
158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958), should be barred by the state
statute of limitations. P contended that no statute of limitations
applied, or that if one did apply, it should be an analogous federal
statute of limitations. Held: Where no limitation is laid down by
Congress, the court will not adopt either a state or a federal
statute of limitations, the only time requirement on the bringing of
the action being the equitable doctrine of laches. Fischbach &
Moore, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engrs, 198 F.
Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
Labor law involves a large portion of federally created law.
Fitting this new law into the established law often causes problems.
The principal case presents one of the problems which arose under
such a federally created right of action. Under this particular
statute the question whether any statute of limitations should be
applied had never before been raised. As the court pointed out in
its opinion, a similar question arose under this section of the
statute in UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.
1959); but the court in that case only decided which of two possible
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